Disorders of consciousness: coma, vegetative and minimally conscious states by Gosseries, Olivia et al.
Chapter 2
Disorders of Consciousness: Coma, Vegetative
and Minimally Conscious States
Olivia Gosseries, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie-Aure´lie Bruno,
Athena Demertzi, Caroline Schnakers, Me´lanie M. Boly, Audrey Maudoux,
Gustave Moonen, and Steven Laureys
Abstract Consciousness can be defined by two components: arousal and aware-
ness. Disorders of consciousness (DOC) are characterized by a disrupted relation-
ship between these two components. Coma is described by the absence of arousal
and, hence, of awareness whereas the vegetative state is defined by recovery of
arousal in the absence of any sign of awareness. In the minimally conscious state,
patients show preserved arousal level and exhibit discernible but fluctuating signs
of awareness. The study of DOC offers unique insights to the neural correlates of
consciousness. We here review the challenges posed by the clinical examination of
DOC patients and discuss the contribution of functional neuroimaging and electro-
physiological techniques to the bedside assessment of consciousness. These studies
raise important issues not only from a clinical and ethical perspective (i.e. diagno-
sis, prognosis and management of DOC patients) but also from a neuroscientific
standpoint, as they enrich our current understanding of the emergence and function
of the conscious mind.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, resuscitation techniques have led to a considerable increase in the
number of patients who survive severe brain injuries. Some patients recover in
the first days after the accident while others die quickly. Others, however, recover
more slowly through different stages before fully or partially recovering consciousness.
Patients in altered states of consciousness present major challenges concerning the
diagnosis, prognosis and daily care. Indeed, detecting signs of consciousness is not
always easy and, in some cases, they may remain unnoticed. Some of these signs
are of prognostic importance. Prognosis, in turn, may influence therapeutic choices.
The interdependency of these factors cannot be ignored: the announcement of a
favorable outcome may imply the commitment of the medical team, while a bad
prognosis may jeopardize the patient’s potential recovery. End-of-life decisions,
aggressive therapy with analgesic drugs and discussion about options of euthanasia
often arise and, in many cases, lead to difficult debates among the medical staff, and
sometimes more widely through the media and society.
2.1.1 Two Components of Consciousness
Clinically defined, consciousness encompasses two main components: arousal and
awareness (Zeman 2001). At the bedside, arousal (also called vigilance or alertness)
is observed by looking at the presence of eye opening. At a neuroanatomical level,
the level of arousal (and in particular of sleep-wake cycles) is mainly supported by
the brainstem (which is the region between the brain and the spinal cord), and the
thalami (which are the nuclei in the center of the brain) (Schiff 2008; Lin 2000).
Awareness, the second component of consciousness, refers to conscious percep-
tion which includes cognition, experiences from the past and the present, and
intentions. At a clinical level, awareness is mostly inferred by command following
(e.g. “squeeze my hand”, “close your eyes”). At a neuroanatomical level, awareness
is underpinned by the cerebral cortex, which is a thin mantle of gray matter
covering the surface of each cerebral hemisphere, and mainly through a wide
frontoparietal network (see Sect. 3.2.1). Awareness can be further divided into
awareness of the environment and awareness of self. Awareness of the environment
can be defined as the conscious perception of one’s environment through the
sensory modalities (e.g. visual, auditory, somesthetic or olfactory perception)
whereas awareness of self is a mental process that does not require the mediation
of the senses and is not related to external stimuli for its presence (as shown by mind
wandering, daydreaming, inner speech, mental imagery, etc.). Awareness of self
also refers to the knowledge of our own social and cultural history as well as our
family membership.
To be aware, we need to be awake but when awake, we are not necessarily
aware. Consciousness depends on the interaction between the activity of the
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cerebral cortex, the brainstem and thalamus. When one of these systems is dis-
rupted, consciousness gets impaired. Thus, consciousness is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon but lies on a continuum of states (Wade 1996). The various states of
consciousness include wakefulness, deep sleep and paradoxical sleep (dreaming
sleep, i.e. rapid eye movement sleep, REM sleep), anesthesia, coma, vegetative
state and the minimally conscious state (Fig. 2.1). The boundaries between these
different states are not always sharp but often are progressive transitions.
But how do these disorders of consciousness (DOC) occur? As illustrated in
Fig. 2.2, after an acute brain injury that could be of traumatic (i.e. motor vehicle
accident, falling, etc.) or non-traumatic (i.e. stroke, anoxia, etc.) etiology, patients
may lose consciousness and fall into a coma. In most cases where the damage is
severe, patients die within a few days. From the moment the patients open their
eyes, they move out of a coma and, if still unresponsive, evolve into a vegetative
state. Typically, the vegetative patient (VS) gradually recovers awareness and
enters a minimally conscious state (MCS). This is often followed by a period of
transient post-traumatic amnesia where the patient remains confused and amnesic.
In most cases, the patient recovers within a few weeks, but in some cases, they may
remain in a state of no awareness or minimal consciousness for several months or
even years or decades. Another exceptional condition the locked-in syndrome
(LIS), where the patient awake from the coma fully conscious but is unable to
move or communicate, except by eye movements.
Fig. 2.1 Illustration of the two major components of consciousness: the level of consciousness
(arousal or wakefulness) and the content of consciousness (awareness) in normal physiological
states, where the level and the content of consciousness are generally positively correlated, and in
pathological states or pharmacological coma (adapted from Laureys 2005)
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2.1.2 Clinical Entities
2.1.2.1 Brain Death
Brain death is characterized by the irreversible loss of all reflexes of the brainstem
and the demonstration of continuing cessation of brain function and respiration in a
persistently comatose patient (Laureys and Fins 2008). There should be an evident
cause of coma, and confounding factors, such as hypothermia (low temperature),
drugs intoxication, electrolyte, and endocrine disturbances should be excluded
(Wijdicks 2001; Laureys 2005). Repeating the evaluation after 6 h is advised, but
this time period is considered arbitrary (The Quality Standards Subcommittee of the
American Academy of Neurology 1995). The absence of electrical brain activity by
electroencephalogram (EEG) or the absence of cerebral blood flow may also serve
as conformational tests (Laureys et al. 2004a).
2.1.2.2 Coma
Coma is a state of non-responsiveness in which the patients lie with eyes closed and
cannot be awakened even when intensively stimulated (Plum and Posner 1983).
Comatose patients are characterized by a lack of sleep–wake cycles (Teasdale and
Jennett 1974) and they have neither verbal production nor response to command but
can present reflexive responses to painful stimulation. In these patients, there is no
awareness of self or of the environment. The autonomous functions such as breath-
ing and thermoregulation are reduced and the patients require respiratory assistance.
Fig. 2.2 Different conditions may follow acute brain injury. Classically, coma lasts for a couple
of days, and once the patients open their eyes they evolve into a vegetative state. Then they may
enter a minimally conscious state after showing some signs of consciousness, and eventually they
recover full consciousness. In rare cases, a person may develop locked-in syndrome, a nearly com-
plete paralysis of the body’s voluntary motor responses
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Global brain metabolism (i.e. energy use) is also diminished by 50–70% of normal
(Laureys 2005). Coma results from a diffuse cortical or white matter damage, or
from a brainstem lesion (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2009). Comamust last at least 1 h to
be distinguished from syncope, concussion, or other states of transient unconscious-
ness. The prognosis is often made within 3 days; if the etiology is traumatic, half of
the patients who have no chance to recover will die during this short period
(Schnakers et al. 2004). Prolonged comas are rare but can last 2–5 weeks and then
progress to brain death, a vegetative state, or more rarely a locked-in syndrome.
2.1.2.3 Vegetative State
The vegetative state (VS), or newly called unresponsive wakefulness syndrom
(Laureys et al, 2010), is defined by eyes opening, either spontaneously or after
stimulation. The sleep–wake cycles are characterized by alternating phases of eye
opening. The autonomous functions are preserved and breathing occurs usually
without assistance. Patients in a vegetative state exhibit no intelligible verbaliza-
tion, no voluntary response and no signs of awareness of self or the environment
(The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 1994). The vegetative patient is awake but
not aware, which shows that both components of consciousness can be completely
separated. If patients are still in a vegetative state a month after brain injury, they
are said to be in a persistent vegetative state. If patients with a non-traumatic
etiology remain in this state for more than 3 months, or more than 1 year for
patients with a traumatic etiology, they are said to be in a permanent vegetative
state (American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine 1995; Jennett and Plum
1972). The term “persistent” refers to a chronic phase and implies an unfavorable
prognosis about the possibility of improvement. This terminology confuses the
diagnosis and the prognosis, which induces a risk that certain therapies, such as a
transfer to a rehabilitation center, are denied to patients diagnosed as in a
persistent vegetative state. Similarly, the term permanent implies near zero
probability of recovery and can therefore give rise to decisions about the cessation
of medication and nutrition. It is preferable to avoid using these two terms (often
both abbreviated as PVS) and rather mention the duration and cause of the
vegetative state.
The brainstem functions of a vegetative patient are preserved, but cortical
(including frontal and parietal cortex) and thalamic injuries are present. Brain
metabolism is diminished by 40–50% of normal values (Laureys et al. 2000a).
The vegetative patient is able to perform a variety of movements, such as grinding
teeth, blinking and moving eyes, swallowing, chewing, yawning, crying, smiling,
grunting or groaning, but these are always reflexive movements and unrelated to the
context. Motor behavior is reduced to a few stereotyped or reflexive movements
and is inadequate compared to the intensity of the stimulation. Typical vegetative
patients do not track with their eyes a moving object or their image in a mirror.
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2.1.2.4 Minimally Conscious State
The minimally conscious state (MCS) (American Congress of Rehabilitation
Medicine 1995; Giacino et al. 2002) is a more recently introduced entity and is
characterized by primary and inconsistent signs of consciousness of self and the
environment. Although patients are unable to communicate functionally, they can
sometimes respond adequately to verbal commands and make understandable
verbalizations. Emotional behaviors, such as smiles, laughter or tears may be
observed. MCS patients may track a moving object, mirror or person (Giacino
et al. 2002). Although these responses may be erratic, they must be reproducible in
order to conclude that the action is intentional. These voluntary actions are quite
distinct from reflexive movements if they are maintained for a sufficient period of
time or repeated.
The overall cerebral metabolic activity is reduced by 20–40% (Laureys et al.
2004b). The autonomous functions are preserved and the thalamocortical and
corticocortical connections are partly restored (Laureys et al. 2000b). Theminimally
conscious state may be transitory, chronic or permanent, such as the vegetative state.
2.1.2.5 Emergence of the Minimally Conscious State
Once patients are able to communicate in a functional way, they are said to have
emerged from the minimally conscious state. They can therefore use multiple obj-
ects in an appropriate manner and their communication systems are adequate and
consistent (Giacino et al. 2002). Because this entity is as recent as the minimally
conscious state, validation and further research of other diagnostic criteria are still
needed.
2.1.2.6 Locked-In Syndrome
Locked-in syndrome (LIS), also known as pseudocoma, is a complete paralysis of
the body resulting from a lesion in the brainstem (American Congress of Rehabili-
tation Medicine 1995). Oral and gestural communications are impossible but
patients are often able to blink and move the eyes. Despite the fact that the patients
cannot move, their sensations are still intact and they are fully aware of their
environment and themselves (Laureys et al. 2005a).
The only way for these patients to communicate with their environment is
through eye movement and sometimes later also with the tip of a finger (Bauby
1997). Indeed, they generally recover some control of their fingers, toes or head.
The LIS patient is able to answer questions by a simple code such as blinking once
for “yes” and twice for “no”, or looking up for “yes” and down for “no”. Many
means of communication have been developed to allow better communication, such
as the use of the alphabet based on letter frequency used in English (i.e. E-T-A-O-I-
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N-S-R-H-L-D-C-U-M-F-P-G-W-Y-B-V-K-X-J-Q-Z) where the patient blinks
when the interlocutor pronounces the desired letter. Here it is necessary to begin
over again for each letter in order to form words and sentences. The use of a brain
computer interface has also recently become an option and allows a LIS survivor to
control his or her environment, use a word processor, operate a telephone or access
the Internet and use email (Gosseries et al. 2009).
Nearly 90% of LIS cases are of vascular etiology but they can also be traumatic.
Cognitive functions are fully preserved if the lesion is only restricted to the
brainstem. If additional cortical lesions are present, the cognitive functions
associated with these cortical areas may be affected (Schnakers et al. 2008).
Contrary to what we might expect, the quality of life reported by chronic LIS
patients is not that much lower than the general population (Bruno 2011) and the
demand for euthanasia, albeit existing, is infrequent (Bruno et al. 2008).
2.1.3 Prognosis
The prognosis for survival and recovery from coma, VS, MCS or LIS is still
difficult to establish at the individual level. Certain factors, however, increase the
chances of recovery. The young age of the patient, a traumatic etiology and the
short duration of the state are linked with a better outcome (The Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS 1994). Additionally, patients who are in a MCS for 1 month after
brain injury have better chances of recovery than patients who are in a VS 1-month
post-injury. Life expectancy of most vegetative patients varies between 2 and
5 years, a few patients stay more than 10 years in this state whereas the average
survival time for LIS patients is about 6 years. Of notice is the fact that exception-
ally some patients can recover even many years after their trauma. Indeed, the
American Terry Wallis, who suffered a car accident in 1984, recovered from the
minimally conscious state in 2003, 19 years later, he started talking (Wijdicks
2006). Similarly, a Polish man suffered a brain trauma in 1988 and was able to
communicate only 19 years later, in 2007.
Clinical and paraclinical assessments can also be used to establish a prognosis,
such as the evaluation of the brainstem reflexes, the sensory evoked potential (SEP),
the cognitive auditory evoked potential (such as P300 and mismatch negativity,
MMN), and the serummarker neuron-specific enolase (NSE). Some of these exami-
nations are described in a later section.
2.2 Clinical Examination
In neurological rehabilitation, the distinction between a vegetative and a minimally
conscious state is of great importance, because of the implications in terms of
prognosis and treatment decisions, but also at the medico-legal and ethical level.
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The main method – known as the gold standard – for detecting signs of conscious-
ness is behavioral observation (Schnakers et al. 2004). The assessment of con-
sciousness in DOC patients is essential from admission throughout hospital
discharge in order to obtain information on their cognitive progress and to define
appropriate care. Clinical evaluations are therefore used to assess the awareness of
self and the environment of the patient. However, no technique is yet available to
measure consciousness directly. We can identify its presence but it is much more
difficult to prove its absence.
2.2.1 Misdiagnosis in Disorders of Consciousness
Although behavioral assessments are essential in evaluating consciousness, they are
sometimes difficult to complete. A patient in a minimally conscious state can be
diagnosed as being in a vegetative state, just as a LIS patient can be easily confused
with a vegetative state. Indeed, voluntary movements may be wrongly interpreted
as reflex movements and motor responses may be very limited due to a paralysis
of all limbs (quadriplegia). Motor responses can also be quickly exhaustible and
therefore not reproducible (Schnakers et al. 2004). The level of arousal can also
fluctuate and patients may become drowsy or even fall asleep while evaluating
them. All these boundaries lead to diagnostic errors. Studies have shown that
20–40% of patients diagnosed as vegetative showed signs of consciousness when
assessed with sensitive and reliable standardized tools (consciousness scales)
(Schnakers et al. 2006, Andrews et al. 1996, Childs and Mercer 1996, Schnakers
et al. 2009).
The differential diagnosis requires repeated behavioral assessments by trained
medical staff. The risk of misdiagnosis increases if the staff is unfamiliar with
the clinical signs of these states. The controversy of some behaviors as reflecting
consciousness or not just comes to add further perplexity. For example, blinking to
visual threat should not be considered as a sign of consciousness (Vanhaudenhuyse
et al. 2008a) whereas visual pursuit clearly should (Giacino et al. 2002). Moreover,
the latter can be tested with different tools but it has been revealed that the best
means for assessing visual pursuit is the use of a mirror which (by presenting the
patient’s own face) has the important ability to grab attention (Vanhaudenhuyse
et al. 2008b). To avoid events of misdiagnosis, it is necessary that well-experienced
personnel use standardized assessments, such as scales and individual testing, in
order to objectify the clinical observations.
2.2.2 Consciousness Scales
Many standardized behavioral scales are used in the assessment of consciousness of
brain injured patients: the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) (Teasdale and Jennett
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1974), the Glasgow Lie`ge Scale (Born 1988a), the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised
(Giacino et al. 2004), the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (Wijdicks et al. 2005),
the Wessex Head Injury Matrix (Shiel et al. 2000), the Coma-Near Coma scale
(Rappaport 2000), the Western Neuro-Sensory Stimulation Profile (Ansell and
Keenan 1989), and the Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique
(Gill-Thwaites 1997) are among the most used. Some scales are an aid for diag-
noses in the early hours of patients’ admission in the intensive care unit (e.g.
the GCS and FOUR) while others are rather used throughout the recovery (e.g.
CRS-R). Here we review the scales that are used most frequently in clinical
practice.
2.2.2.1 Glasgow Coma Scale and Glasgow Lie`ge Scale
The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is the scale of reference used internationally, due
to its short and simple administration. It is mainly used in intensive care settings.
The GCS measures eye, verbal and motor behaviors. However, the verbal response
is impossible to assess in the case of intubation or tracheotomy (patients with
artificial respiratory help making speech impossible). Additionally, there may be
some concern as to what extent eye opening is sufficient for assessing brainstem
function (Laureys et al. 2002a). The total score varies between 3 and 15. In acute
stages, brain damage is described as serious if the score is less than or equal to 8 and
moderate if the score is between 9 and 12 (Deuschl and Eisen 1999). The Glasgow
Lie`ge Scale (GLS) is an extended version of the GCS which includes the
standardized evaluation of brainstem reflexes (Born 1988b).
2.2.2.2 Full Outline of Unresponsiveness
The Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) is a more recent scale that has been
proposed to replace the GCS as it detects more subtle neurological changes
(Wijdicks et al. 2005). The scale is named after the number of subscales (eye,
motor, brainstem reflexes and respiration) as well as after the maximum score that
each subscale can take (four). The assessment takes only a few minutes to adminis-
ter. It does not include a verbal response, and can therefore be used to assess
artificially ventilated or intubated patients. The FOUR is particularly suitable for
diagnosing vegetative state, locked-in syndrome and brain death. It also allows to
differentiate between VS and MCS patients as it assesses visual pursuit, one of the
first signs of recovery of consciousness (Giacino et al. 2002).
2.2.2.3 Coma Recovery Scale-Revised
The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) also is a recent clinical tool that has
been specifically developed to disentangle VS from MCS patients, but also MCS
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patients from patients who recovered their ability to communicate functionally
(Giacino et al. 2004). Indeed, it is the only scale to explicitly incorporate the
diagnostic criteria of vegetative and minimally conscious state. It consists of
six subscales: auditory, visual, motor and oromotor/verbal functions as well as
communication and arousal. The 23 items are ordered according to their degree of
complexity; the lowest item on each subscale represents reflexive activity while the
highest item represents behaviors that are cognitively mediated. Scoring is based on
the presence or absence of operationally defined behavioral responses to specific
sensory stimuli (e.g. if the item of visual pursuit is present, the patient’s state is
diagnosed as minimally conscious). The brainstem reflexes are also measured but
not scored. The assessment takes between 10 and 60 min, depending on the
patient’s responsiveness. In many research centers, the CRS-R is regarded as
the gold standard for the behavioral assessment of severely brain injured patients.
The scale has been translated and validated in several languages (Schnakers et al
2008) and is freely available (see http://www.comascience.org).
2.2.2.4 Wessex Head Injury Matrix
The objective of this scale is to create a transition between the assessment of coma
in acute stages and the realization of neuropsychological tests that are applied much
later. The evaluation is based on observations for presence or absence of behaviors.
The WHIM has been designed to pick up minute indices demonstrating recovery
and it covers a wide range of daily life functions. It assesses motor and cognitive
skills, social interactions, the level of wakefulness and the auditivo-verbal, visual-
motor and tactile modalities (Majerus and Van der Linden 2000). Compared to the
CRS-R, this 62 item matrix assesses the patient without giving any diagnosis, since
it does not incorporate the criteria of VS and MCS. It is more useful in assessing
MCS patients who show minimal improvement, and in setting goals for rehabi-
litation from the outset of coma.
2.2.3 Individual Bedside Assessment
Another way to assess severely brain injured patients, which is complementary to
the standardized scales, is a quantitative assessment based on the principles of
single-subject experimental design. This method identifies whether a specific
behavior of interest can be performed in response to command and whether the
reliability of this behavior can change over time either spontaneously or in
response to treatment (Whyte et al. 1999). The presence of command-following
is crucial evidence of consciousness and facilitates differentiation between MCS
and VS patients. The ability to follow a command is also important in the
rehabilitation process because it means the patient can participate in therapies.
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It can also be the starting point of communication. Indeed, specific movements
can be used as a means of communication such as “make a thumbs up” for yes and
“shake your head” for no.
Quantitative assessment can also lead to conclusions about a patient’s visual
function that are not readily apparent by clinical observation (Whyte and
DiPasquale 1995). Attention deficits, blindness, gaze preference, monocular pathol-
ogy and impairment in one or both visual fields can be observed objectively through
this method by showing the patient a blank card or a photograph, either individually
or at the same time, in both visual fields. Systematic visual orienting that involves
visual discrimination is evidence of cortical function (i.e. if the patient looks at a
picture more often than a blank card). The awareness of these deficits may help to
avoid confounding the assessment of a patient’s cognitive functions and can also
help to adapt the therapy. For example, if a patient presents a left-sided neglect, the
therapist should be positioned primarily on the right side to optimize patient’s
responsiveness.
2.3 Complementary Examination
Brain imaging and electrophysiology techniques are objective ways to investigate
residual brain functions in disorders of consciousness. They may show the extent
of brain damage for diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic purposes and can also
be used in experimental research. The imaging techniques can therefore lead to a
better understanding of the behavioral clinical observations. To simplify, we
present two main types of methods which are used for cognitive neuroimaging
studies: metabolic or hemodynamic measurements (e.g. positron emission tomog-
raphy, PET; functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) and electrical
measurements (e.g. electroencephalography, EEG; event related potentials,
ERP). The PET technique can measure changes in the brain’s metabolism using
a radioactive tracer (labeled glucose) that is injected into the blood and is
accumulated by active areas of the brain (using energy from the glucose). The
fMRI indirectly measures regional increases in blood flow by analyzing the
magnetic resonance properties of hemoglobin, which varies depending on the
blood’s oxygenation (energy use). These functional neuroimaging techniques
should be distinguished from structural imaging such as X-ray CT or conven-
tional MRI (offering imaging of the brain without telling anything about their
functioning). Electrical measurements collect signals that are related to the
intracellular electric current of the brain. PET and fMRI techniques have good
spatial resolution but their temporal resolution is poor, whereas EEG methods
have excellent temporal resolution but spatial resolution is relatively low and
signals from deeper areas are difficult to identify (Laureys and Boly 2008).
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2.3.1 Electroencephalography
Electroencephalography (EEG) records continuously and non-invasively the
spontaneous electrical brain activity through electrodes placed on the scalp. The
EEG well identifies the level of vigilance (Fang et al. 2005) and detects functional
cerebral anomalies such as seizures. It can also be used to confirm the clinical
diagnosis of brain death (Gue´rit et al. 2002). The utility of the EEG has been
demonstrated to predict poor recovery of patients with brain anoxic and traumatic
injury (Zandbergen et al. 1998). However, most of the EEG patterns are not
specific (Young 2000) and do not allow reliable differentiation between conscious
and unconscious brain processing. The interpretation of raw EEG signals also
requires considerable expertise and training. More automated measures deriving
from the EEG are therefore welcome, such as the EEG bispectral index
measurements.
2.3.1.1 Bispectral Index
The bispectral index (BIS) measures the depth of sedation in anesthesia (Struys
et al. 1998) and allows distinction between the different phases of normal sleep
(Nieuwenhuijs et al. 2002). BIS values range between 0 and 100: when the subject
is awake the values approach 100, whereas when the subject is under general
anesthesia, values are around 40–50. BIS values also gradually increase when
patients move out from coma to recovery (Schnakers et al. 2008a). However, BIS
is a nonspecific measure of consciousness and does not systematically differentiate
MCS from VS patients, even if it seems to show prognostic utility (Schnakers et al.
2005b).
2.3.1.2 Event-Related Potentials
The event-related potential (ERP) technique objectively examines sensory and
cognitive functions at the patient’s bedside by averaging the EEG activity
according to the onset of a repeated stimulus (e.g. noise or visual flash). ERPs
reveal the time course of information processing from low-level peripheral recep-
tive structures to high-order associative cortices (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2008c).
Short-latency ERPs, or exogenous ERP components (ranging from 0 to 100 ms),
correspond to the passive (automatic) reception of external stimuli whereas cogni-
tive ERPs, or endogenous ERP components (obtained after 100 ms), often reflect
cognitive neuronal activity. The ERPs provide neurological markers, where the
absence of early ERPs is a good predictor of a bad outcome (i.e. absence of primary
cortical responses on somatosensory ERPs) and the presence of cognitive ERPs
a good predictors of a favorable outcome (i.e. P300 and Mismatch Negativity
responses) (Daltrozzo et al. 2007).
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Short-Latency ERPs
Sensory evoked potentials (SEPs) are short-latency ERPs that are routinely used
in intensive care. They measure the connection from the body to the brain (called
the ascending pathways, which involve the spinal cord, the brainstem, and the
primary sensory cortex). Practically, electrical stimulations are elicited from the
wrist and the responses are recorded at the level of the nerves, spinal cord,
brainstem and cortical levels. Bilateral absence of the cortical response (N20)
among patients in coma, especially in anoxic patients who had a lack of oxygen in
the brain, after for example cardiac arrest, is strongly associated with poor
outcome, but preserved SEPs do not necessarily herald recovery (Cant et al.
1986; Laureys et al. 2005b).
Long-Latency Cognitive ERPs
Mismatch negativity (MMN) is a cognitive ERPs response elicited after approxi-
mately 100–200 ms by any change in a sequence of monotonous auditory stimuli in
inattentive subjects (Naatanen and Alho 1997). It assesses the residual brain activity
and more specifically the integrity of echoic memory, a memory that permits a
sound to be remembered in the 2 or 3 s after it is heard. The presence of MMN has
prognostic value in predicting recovery after coma (Kane et al. 1996; Fischer et al.
2004; Naccache et al. 2005; Qin et al. 2008).
The auditory evoked potentials P300 response is another ERP wave which is also
elicited (around 300 ms after the stimulus) when subjects detect a rare and unpre-
dictable target stimulus in a regular train of standard stimuli (Sutton et al. 1965).
It assesses the integrity of acoustic and semantic discrimination. The presence of
P300 and MMN is associated with a favorable clinical outcome but their absence
does not necessarily imply a poor prognosis as these components can also be absent
in some healthy controls, as well as in a significant number of patients who later
recover consciousness (van der Stelt and van Boxtel 2008).
The P300 wave can also be observed in response to the patient’s own name in VS
and MCS patients, when they hear their own name in a sequence of unfamiliar
names in a passive condition (Perrin et al. 2006). When asking patients to perform a
cognitive task such as counting the number of times they hear their own name, the
P300 to the own name stimuli increases (Schnakers et al. 2008b). This permits a
demonstration that patients with apparently no behavioral sign of consciousness
may be conscious (i.e. show command following) (Schnakers et al. 2009, p. 4588).
The P300 ERP technique is also being used to permit EEG-based communication
(i.e. in Brain Computer Interface technology) (Sellers et al. 2006), which could
allow LIS patients to communicate through their electrical brain activity without
moving a single muscle.
2 Disorders of Consciousness: Coma, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States 41
2.3.2 Functional Neuroimaging
2.3.2.1 Resting State
PET studies have shown that global cerebral metabolism during deep sleep and
general anesthesia is diminished by about half of normal values (Maquet et al. 1997;
Alkire et al. 1999). The brain metabolism of VS patients is also reduced by 50–60%
(Laureys et al. 1999; Levy et al. 1987). However, when the patient has clinically
recovered, brain metabolism does not always return back to normal (Fig. 2.3)
(Laureys et al. 2000c).
Some brain regions appear to be more important than others for the emergence of
consciousness. At rest, patients in a vegetative state show systematic impairment of
metabolism in the frontoparietal network that includes polymodal associative
cortices (bilateral prefrontal regions, Broca’s area, parietotemporal and posterior
parietal areas, and precuneus) (Laureys et al. 2006a).
These regions are essential in various functions that are necessary for conscious-
ness, such as attention, memory, and language (Baars et al. 2003). Conscious
perception is also linked to the functional connectivity between this frontoparietal
network and deeper centers of the brain, such as the thalamus (Fig. 2.4). In
vegetative patients, the long-distance connections between different cortical areas
as well as between the cortex and the thalamus seem disconnected. The recovery of
patients in a vegetative state is linked to the restoration of this frontoparietal
network and its connections (Laureys et al. 2000b).
Fig. 2.3 Global cerebral metabolism in various states (adapted from Laureys et al. 2004a)
42 O. Gosseries et al.
2.3.2.2 External Stimulation
Despite a massively reduced resting metabolism, primary cortices still seem to be
activated during external stimulation in vegetative patients, whereas hierarchically
higher-order multimodal association areas are not. When painful stimuli are
administered to vegetative patients, only the brainstem, the thalamus and the
primary somatosensory cortex are activated, and the latter is isolated and discon-
nected from the other brain areas, in particular the frontoparietal network (Boly
et al. 2005; Laureys et al. 2002b). These findings support the idea that patients in a
vegetative state do not consciously perceive pain as do healthy people. In contrast
to VS, MCS patients, similar to control subjects, show activation of the complete
pain matrix (thalamus, primary and secondary somatosensory, frontoparietal, and
anterior cingulate cortices) and show a preserved functional connectivity between
these areas (Boly et al. 2008). These results provide evidence for a preserved cons-
cious pain perception capacity in MCS patients, strongly suggesting that these
patients should receive pain treatment when needed.
Similarly, in response to auditory stimuli, brain activity in vegetative patients
is limited to the primary auditory cortex while polymodal areas of higher order do
Fig. 2.4 Brain regions encompassing prefrontal and parietal multi-modal associative areas
(known as the frontoparietal network) are crucial for consciousness. Conscious perception is also
linked to the functional connectivity between this frontoparietal network and deeper centers of the
brain such as the thalamus. The vegetative state is characterized by a metabolic dysfunction of this
widespread cortical network shown in dark grey (adapted from Laureys 2007)
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not become active and remain functionally disconnected (Boly et al. 2004; Laureys
et al. 2000d). This primary brain activation does not seem enough to lead to
conscious perception and memory formation. In contrast, patients in a minimally
conscious state activate higher-order cortical areas. More specifically, a recent
study showed a selective impairment in backward connectivity from frontal to
temporal cortices in vegetative patients whereas minimally conscious patients
present a similar pattern to healthy subjects with preserved feedforward and top-
down processes (Boly et al. 2011) Auditory stimuli with emotional content, such as
baby cries or the patient’s own name, induce even more extensive brain activation
than sounds without meaning (Fig. 2.5) (Laureys et al. 2004b; Boly et al. 2005).
This implies that content is important when talking to patients in a minimally
conscious state.
Similarly, in response to presentation of the patient’s own name uttered by a
familiar voice, the primary auditory cortices of five VS patients were activated, but
none of these patients recovered. In contrast, two other VS patients showed atypical
activation of both primary cortex and higher-level associative cortex, and they
improved clinically to MCS 3 months after their scan (Di et al. 2007). Another
fMRI study showed that MCS patients demonstrated similar responses to healthy
volunteers when listening to passive language with personalized narratives. How-
ever, when the narratives were presented as a time-reversed signal (without linguistic
content) MCS patients demonstrated markedly reduced responses, suggesting again
reduced engagement for linguistically meaningless stimuli (Schiff et al. 2005).
Another fMRI study based onmental imagery tasks has been proposed to identify
signs of consciousness in non-communicative patients (Boly et al. 2007). Despite the
clinical diagnosis of vegetative state, a 23-year-old girl who suffered a traumatic
brain injury 5months earlier showed signs of consciousness only detectable on fMRI
(Owen et al. 2006). She was asked to imagine herself playing tennis and walking
Fig. 2.5 Brain activations during presentation of noise, baby cries, and the patient’s own name.
Stimuli with emotional valence (baby’s cries and names) induce a much more widespread activation
than does meaningless noise in the minimally conscious state (taken from Laureys et al. 2004)
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through her house. The results showed brain activation similar to that of the control
subjects for both tasks (Fig. 2.6). This study shows clear evidence of awareness and
command-following in the absence of voluntary motor responsiveness. The patient
evolved into MCS several weeks later and she was probably in a stage of transition
from vegetative to recovery of consciousness at the time of assessment. Finally,
another study recently showed that it has been possible for a vegetative patient to
communicate through the fMRI. He could answer questions by imaging playing
tennis when he wanted to say “yes” and imaging moving into his house when he
wanted to respond “no” (Monti and Vanhaudenhuyse et al, 2010).
2.4 Treatment
There is currently no effective standardized treatment for DOC patients. Most of the
studies have been conducted under suboptimal settings with methodological and
conceptual problems, with the consequence that no strong evidence-based recom-
mendations can be made. However, uncontrolled studies indicate that some reha-
bilitative procedures can promote the recovery of consciousness, especially in
MCS patients. These interventions can be divided into pharmacological and non-
pharmacological treatments.
Fig. 2.6 A patient (top two images) who was clinically diagnosed as vegetative showed similar
brain activity to a healthy subject (bottom two images) when asked to imaging playing tennis (left)
or visiting her own house (right). A few months after the study, the patient recovered conscious-
ness (taken from Owen et al. 2006)
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2.4.1 Pharmacologic Treatment
The effect of pharmacological agents on recovery in chronic disorders of
consciousness still remains unsatisfactory (Laureys et al. 2006b; Demertzi
et al. 2008). Several therapeutic trials have been conducted with post-comatose
patients and have led to a marked improvement in their level of consciousness.
Zolpidem is a drug originally used in the treatment of insomnia that has
occasionally the opposite effect in brain damaged patients. A recent study
showed that on 15 patients, only one demonstrated a clinically significant
response after the administration of the medication, suggesting a response rate
to zolpidem around 7% (Whyte et al. 2009). The effect of Zolpidem was first
reported after its use in a 23-year-old man who had been in a vegetative state for
more than 3 years following a motor vehicle accident. The patient regained
consciousness 15 min after being administered the drug and was able to greet his
mother for the first time in 3 years. He was able to sigh, to talk and to
communicate with his family (Clauss et al. 2000). But after the effects of the
drug wore off, he relapsed, returning to his previous state. Zolpidem has
therefore only a temporary effect and lasts for a maximum of a few hours.
Temporary improvements have since been observed in stroke and near drowning
patients (Clauss and Nel 2004), anoxic brain injury (Cohen and Duong 2008),
vegetative (Clauss and Nel 2006) and minimally conscious states (Brefel-
Courbon et al. 2007; Shames and Ring 2008). The results varied from a regain
of consciousness to an enhancement of motor, verbal and cognitive functions, as
well as gestural interaction and arousal. The exact underlying mechanism of the
effect of Zolpidem remains unclear (Clauss et al. 2004).
Amantadine is another drug that produces similar effects on VS and MCS
patients but its effects last longer (Whyte et al. 2005; Zafonte et al. 2000). It is a
dopaminergic agent (also acting on NMDA receptors) initially used against the flu
and in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease. A recent study involving a chronic
anoxic MCS patient showed cognitive improvement after 3 weeks of Amantadine
treatment, such as reproducible movement to command (i.e. touching a ball with the
feet) and consistent automatic motor responses (i.e. mouth opening when a spoon is
approaching). These improvements were associated with an increase in fronto-
parietal cortical metabolism which is considered important in consciousness
(Schnakers et al. 2008c).
Other pharmacological agents that have been reported as inducing functional
recovery are Levodopa, Bromocriptine (Passler and Riggs 2001) Apomorphine
(Fridman et al. 2010), and Baclofen (Taira and Hori 2007). Large scale studies on
the efficacy of these drugs are still warranted. More specifically, cohort placebo-
controlled randomized trials and blinded within-subject crossover designs are
needed before reaching any definite conclusions concerning the efficacy of the
pharmacological treatment of DOCs.
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2.4.2 Non-pharmacological Treatment
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been proposed as a strategy to improve the
functional level of chronic non-communicative patients. This technique consists of
implanting an electrode in the brain (more specifically in this case in the thalamus) in
order to reactivate a widespread cerebral connectivity mechanism that supports
communication and goal-directed behavior. Bilateral DBS of the central thalamus
has been performed in a 38-year-old patient who remained in a MCS for 6 years
following a traumatic brain injury (Schiff et al. 2007). The electrodes were placed in
the intralaminar thalamic nuclei. It has been shown that these thalamic nuclei restore
cortical connectivity in the recovery of consciousness after VS (Laureys 2000b,
p. 2913). Before applyingDBS, theMCSpatient failed to recover consistent command
following and remained in a non-verbal state without any sign of functional commu-
nication. His fMRI, however, showed the preservation of a bihemispheric large-scale
cerebral language network, which demonstrates that further recovery was possible
(Schiff et al. 2005). During periods in which DBS was on (as compared to periods in
which it was off), levels of arousal, motor control and interactive behavior increased
considerably. The patient was able to respond consistently to commands and produced
intelligible verbalization. The DBS technique can therefore promote a significant
functional recovery from severe traumatic brain injury. Nevertheless, replicas of
these findings are still needed to validate the technique.
Other non-pharmacologic and non-invasive interventions are the multimodal
sensory stimulation techniques which provide frequent sensory input to all five
senses in the hope that it will enhance synaptic reinnervation and accelerate
neurological recovery (Demertzi et al. 2008; Tolle and Reimer 2003). Sensory
stimulation is also intended to prevent sensory deprivation and facilitates coherence
between the brain and the body. Sensory regulation is a variant of sensory stimula-
tion that facilitates information processing by adjusting the time exposure and the
complexity of the stimuli according to the level of the patient’s capacity (Wood
et al. 1992). The stimulation sessions are alternated with resting periods in order to
increase the ability of the patient to respond during stimulation sessions. Finally,
physical and occupational therapy are usually used in rehabilitation centers to
prevent complications and enhance recovery. There is uncontrolled evidence that
early and increased intervention leads to better outcomes (Oh and Seo 2003; Shiel
et al. 2001). The beneficial effects of all these techniques are still debated and are
not yet based on evidence.
2.5 Ethical Issues
DOC patients, especially patients in vegetative state, present important ethical and
moral issues (Demertzi et al in press). In many countries, it is legally permissible to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment once the patient is diagnosed as being in a
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permanent VS (i.e. with no hope of recovery), if such withdrawal seems likely to be
what the patient would have wanted (Jennett 2005). It is therefore recommended to
make an advance directive concerning personal wishes in the event of vegetative
survival that could legitimately be used by the doctor to withdraw or to sustain the
treatment (Demertzi et al 2011).
Three cases have generated considerable debate, positioning pro-life advocates
against those defending the right to die with dignity. American Karen Ann Quinlan
suffered a cardio-pulmonary arrest in 1975 and became vegetative. Her parents
signed the authorization to disconnect the respirator, but the hospital authorities
refused because the parents did not have legal custody. A judicial process began and
a year later the court gave legal custody to the parents. Karen was disconnected but,
against all odds, she continued breathing by herself. She survived in this vegetative
state for 9 years until her death in 1985 (Dundon 1978). The case of the American
Terri Schiavo is similar but here the parents wished to keep her alive against the
wishes of her husband and despite the advice of doctors. After suffering a respira-
tory insufficiency in 1990, Terri was considered as being in a permanent vegetative
state but this diagnosis was criticized by the parents still hoping for a recovery
(Cochrane 2006). The Supreme Court of the United States finally rejected the
request of her parents to keep her alive and she died in 2005, 13 days after the
disconnection of her feeding tube. The most recent case involved the Italian Eluana
Englaro, who was left in a vegetative state after a motor vehicle accident in 1992.
Her father requested shortly after the accident to have her feeding tube removed but
the authorities refused his request. He received the authorization only 17 years later.
She finally died in February 2009.
It is also ethically controversial for some whether or not non-communicative
patients can be included in clinical trials, as they are unable to provide their
agreement. Informed consent is therefore requested from the patient’s legal surro-
gate. The medical community is redefining an ethical framework in order to balance
protection for post-comatose patients against the facilitation of research and medi-
cal progress (Fins 2003; Fins et al. 2008).
2.6 Conclusion
Defining consciousness as having two components (arousal and awareness) helps us
also define the corresponding clinical entities. Coma means lack of consciousness
(unarousable unawareness), whereas in the vegetative state arousal is preserved but
awareness is absent (arousable unawareness). In the minimally conscious state,
arousal is also present but with fluctuating and minimal signs of awareness. Locked-
in syndrome has to be differentiated from those disorders of consciousness,
as consciousness is intact but voluntary motor control is completely impaired
(except for eye movements). In clinical practice, although the Glasgow Coma
Scale remains the gold standard for the assessment of comatose patients, the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised is more appropriate in differentiating between
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vegetative and minimally conscious or locked-in patients. Misdiagnosis is still too
frequent in clinical practice despite the introduction of diagnostic criteria. Con-
scious patients can indeed be diagnosed as vegetative if they have unnoticed
paralysis or if voluntary movements are erroneously interpreted as reflexes. Family
members of LIS patients are often the first to realize that the patient is conscious
(Laureys et al. 2003; Leon-Carrion et al. 2002). Standardized behavioral scales and
quantitative individual assessments should therefore be employed repetitively in
the clinical routine by trained medical staff, in order to minimize the risk of
erroneous diagnosis.
Technological advances in neuroimaging allow us to increase our understanding
of the human brain and this knowledge can be exploited in order to develop new
diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic approaches (Laureys and Boly 2008). Stud-
ies have shown that the vegetative state is characterized by a functional cortical
disconnection syndrome. Only primary cortex can be activated and is disconnected
from the higher-order frontoparietal network. In the minimally conscious state,
however, the latter areas can be activated especially by emotionally meaningful or
noxious stimuli. It has also been shown that neuronal plasticity (e.g. axonal
regrowth) may exist, sometimes many months to years after the brain trauma, and
this could promote the recovery of consciousness in MCS patients (Schiff et al.
2005; Voss et al. 2006).
DOC patients have rather limited therapeutic options. Basic therapies include
life-sustaining therapy (i.e. artificial nutrition and hydration) as well as physical and
occupational therapies that are used to prevent complications and enhance recovery
(the latter awaits controlled trials). Pharmacologic trials (with Amantadine and
Zolpidem) have shown behavioral improvements in some uncontrolled case reports
or series of brain injured patients. Deep brain stimulation and multisensory
stimulations also showed some positive results but are clearly still in the research
domain. Nowadays, therapeutic management lacks large-scale double-blind rando-
mized placebo controlled trials. Much more research and methodical validation are
required before accepting or rejecting specific treatments.
Advanced communication techniques based on mental imagery and on cognitive
event-related potentials using active paradigms are also currently being inves-
tigated. Indeed, brain computer interface (BCI) devices allow brain signals to
control external devices without requiring any muscular activity. For example,
mental imagery and measurement of the salivary pH can permit a LIS patient to
communicate: to say “yes”, the patient had to imagine a lemon, which increases
salivary pH, whereas to say “no”, the patient had to imagine milk, which decreases
pH (Wilhelm et al. 2006; Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2007). Also, it is expected that BCI
techniques will be used clinically as a diagnostic tool for differentiating between
conscious and unconscious patients (Kubler and Kotchoubey 2007, Sorger 2009),
as we have previously seen with the fMRI tennis and spatial mental imagery
paradigms.
Neuroimaging studies are moving from the research field to the clinical applica-
tion of these techniques currently being validated by multi-centric cohort studies.
These paraclinical examinations are providing additional information, unavailable
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through bedside clinical assessments, which is being used to better understand the
patient’s diagnosis and prognosis. It can be predicted that in the near future,
multimodal approaches combining bedside examination, electrophysiology and
functional imaging techniques will be routinely employed to assess and treat
these challenging patients with disorders of consciousness.
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